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Whatever may be the constitutional fate of Indiana's
anti-hate act, it is difficult to refute the merit or deny the
applicability of these words of the late Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"Those who won our independence believed that .
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate pro-
tection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be
a fundamental principle of the American Government ...
"No danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence.'85
And ponder the words of Chafee:
"The danger is not in the suppression of any particular
doctrine or group, but in the very existence of suppression
. . . The suppression of opponents has the same delightful
fascination in our day that cutting off head had in the French
Revolution. But the moderate republicans who first rejoiced
in that method soon found it employed by their opponents,
and the control of the guillotine shifted from group to group,
of increasingly extreme views, until finally the conservatives
seized it and beheaded Robespierre."6
THE ANTI-STRIKE ACT
Chapter 341 is designed to prevent disruption of public
utility services resulting from strikes, slowdowns, lockouts
or similar work stoppages in the electric, gas, water, tele-
phone or transportation industries.' Strikes are prohibited
actment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which
are essential to its validity." For complete concurring opinion
see pp. 372-380 of the report.
85. Concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 351, 375,
377 (1926).
86. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1940), p. 527. Cf.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
1. The act has been informally interpreted as not being applicable
to municipally owned utilities in view of the construction that a
statute must be in terms applicable to the sovereign or its po-
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and compulsory conciliation and arbitration are substituted.
The Act provides fdr the appointment of (a) a panel of 10
persons to serve as Conciliators and (b) a panel of 30 persons
to serve as members of Boards of Arbitration.
In the event of a bargaining stalemate between one of
the specified employers and its employees, a Conciliator is
appointed by the Governor upon the petition of either party.
In the event no settlement is reached within 30 days,2 the
Conciliator freports this fact to the Governor who then selects
three members from the Panel of Arbitrators to sit as a Board
of Arbitration.-
The Board of Arbitration holds hearings, makes findings
of fact and is empowered to interpret the existing contract,
or if none exists, to establish, within 60 days, the terms of
a contract fixing the wages or conditions of employment
which are in dispute.4 The findings, decision and order of
the Board are filed in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit
Court wherein the dispute arose or in any county where the
employer operates or maintains an office. The date of filing
is the efective date of the order and it is effective for one
year, subject to modification by agreement of the parties.
Judicial review, when desired, must be taken within 15
days of the filing by petition to the Circuit Court of any
county where the employer has an office or place of business.
Judicial review is limited to the following statutory grounds:
(a) that the parties were not given a reasonable opportunity
to be heard, dr (b) that the Board of Arbitration exceeded
its powers, or (c) that the order is unreasonable in that it is
not supported by the evidence, or (d) that the order was pro-
cured by fraud, collusion or other unlawful means. The nor-
mal rules of civil procedure concerning summons and change
of venue from county or judge are retained. Reversal of the
order of the Board is confined to the statutory grounds given
above. In the event of reversal, the Governor must appoint
another Board of Arbitration or attempt further conciliation.
litical subdivisions. U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America,
67 S. Ct. 677 (U.S., 1947). Further, there is no righht on the part
of municipal utilities to enter into collective bargaining agreements,
Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind. (1944) p. 224.
2. An additional 30 days may be granted by the Governor.
3. The act also permits 2 ex-officio members, one designated by each
party to the dispute to sit on the Board.
4. See § 10 of the Act.
5. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 365, regulating proceedings, orders, determina-
tions, and judicial review of state administrative agencies is
19471 313
INDIANA LAw JOURNAL
Violation of the Act by any party constitutes a misde-
meanor and is amenable by fine of no less than five hun-
dred dollars ($500) or more than twenty-five hundred dollars
($2500) and imprisonment for not more than six months., No
attempt is made to (a) make the union liable as a legal entity
or (b) impart liability upon its officers for action not amount-
ing t6 active participation or encouraging such unlawful ac-
tion. The Act is directed toward concerted action to stop
work in the specified industries and specifically exempts the
individual's right to cease employment. It further prohibits
any judicial order compelling an individual to render labor or
services. Any person adversely affected by violation of the
act may restrain such violation by petition to the Circuit
Court of the county in which the violation occurs.8
Statutes with a parallel objective have been recently con-
sidered and passed by Congress 9 and by other states,10 not-
ably New Jersey" and Virginia.12  These statutes, however,
provide different methods of arbitration and enforcement
when conciliation and arbitration fail.18
applicable to the Board of Arbitration proceedings since the
Board is not expressly exempted. Section 18 of c. 365 provides
for judicial review "exclusively upon the record.."
6. See Ind. Acts 1947, c. 341, § 13.
7. Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v.
U.S., 67 S. Ct. 775 (U.S., 1947).
8. The "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" is made inapplicable in this
situation. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 40-501 to 514.
9. Taft-Hartley Act, H.R. 3020, passed 23 June 1947.
10. See 39 P.U. Fort, 34, 276, 687 (1947).
11. N.J. Laws 1946, c. 38, amended by N.J. Laws, 1947, cc. 47 and 48;3 P.H. Labor Serv. ff 47,522, 2 A. C.C.H. Labor Serv. N.J. 42,503.
12. Va. Laws 1947, c. 9, 3 P.H. Labor Serv. 47,648, 2 A. C.C.H.
Labor Serv. Va. 43,406 et seq.
13. Under the New Jersey Act, in the event of failuure to agree to
conditions of employment and no submission to arbitration,
both parties choose Public Hearing Panel of 3 mem-
bers who hold public hearings and submit findings to the Gov-
ernor. If either party refuses to abide by the recommendation of
the Panel, and if in the opinion of the Governor, it interferes with
public health, etc., the Governor seizes and operates for the state.
Upon settlement the plant is returned. See (1946) 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 1002.
Under the Virginia act, either party gives notice to the Gov-
ernor, who calls a conference. If no agreement after a second
conference and either party feels it is useless to further negotiate
or refuses to do so, the Governor is notified and he requests arbi-
tration. If the parties refuse, the Governor then seizes the indus-
tries. They are returned when in a position to resume normal
operation. See, (1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. 955.
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The following major legal issues are raised concening the
validity of the Act: (1) its validity in the light of possible
conflict with federal legislation, (2) federal constitutionality
under the 13th and 14th amendments, and (3) state consti-
tutionality with reference to (a) separation of powers and
(b) the legislative power to regulate judicial review.
1. Conflict with federal legislation.
Limitations upon the state power to regulate are depend-
ent upon: (a) express provisions of the Federal Constitution,1 4
(b) the exclusive federal nature of the subject matter 15 and
(c) whether the federal government has acted in a field of
concurrent jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state.8 Con-
sideration of the Indiana act falls within the latter classifica-
tion since the federal power in this field stems from the Com-
merce Clause'7 which has been interpreted to perniit some
state regulation of 'local' matters."'
State regulation in the face of federal action within a
concurrent field is void where there is a direct conflict with
the federal regulation on the subject. 9 Also, where enabling
authority to act under federal legislation is unexercised, state
authdrity is limited to parallel action, 20 however, it must not
"so deal with matters left to its control as to stand as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.'
Considering the Indiana Act in the light of federal legis-
lation in the field, two problems are raised: first, conflict
with the Railway Labor Act 22 as applied to those transporta-
tion companies falling within its purview and, secondly, con-
flict with the National Labor Relations Act as amended s in
the remaining public utility fields covered by the Indiana Act.
14. E.g., the power to levy import and export taxes, to make treaties,
etc.
15. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
16. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Rel. Ed., 67 S. Ct. 1026(1947).
17. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 310 U.S. 1 (1937).
18. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Phila., 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
19. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
20. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
21. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. Labor Rel. Ed., n. 16, supra. at
1030; Cf. Hill v. Fla., 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
22. 45 U.S.C., § 151 et seq.




It is clear that the conciliation and mediation measures
of the Railway Labor Act supersede the Indiana provisions
inasinuch as Congress has pre-empted this field.24 The Rail-
way Labor act, however, does not provide for compulsory ar-
bitration nor does it prohibit strikes in the event of the fail-
ure to reach a settlement.2 5 It is possible that the Indiana
Act, in providing for compulsory arbitration and refusing the
right to strike, would find application to railroads under the
Railway Labor Act, if at all, subsequent to the refusal of the
parties to submit the dispute to the Railway Mediation or
Adjustment Board.
In the second category, i.e., possible conflict with the
National Labor Relations Act as amended, in the remaining
industries covdred by the act, the basic problem presented is
the conflict with the "purposes and objectives"26 of the fed-
eral legislation rather than that of direct conflict. Inasmuch
as the Supreme Court's interpretation and construction of
the Congressional intent in enacting this legislation27 ultimate-
ly determines the validity of the Indiana Act, it is feasible
pede or diminish the right to strike. One rule of con-
could be sustained or defeated.28
Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act provides
that nothing therein shall be construed to interfere with, im-
pede or diminish the right to strike. (Under) One rule of
struction utilized by the Supreme Court, that "any con-
current state power that may exist is restricted to the nar-
rowest of limits"' 29 would indicate that the Indiana Act would
fall as being in conflict with the "purposes and objectives" of
the National Labor Relations Act. The above provision of
the National Labor Relations Act, however, does not purport
to grant the right to strike. It is merely a negative restric-
24. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (10).
25. Erie R.R. v. N.Y., 233 U.S. 671 (1914); cf. Railway Mail Assn.
v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
26. See n. 21, supra.
27. The question of Congressional intent in passing the National Labor
Relations Act was raised but not decided in A.F.L. v. Watson, 327
U.S. 582 (1946).
28. "The line of demarcation (between state and federal power) 'ex-
ists' only in the sense that it lies somewhere at a given time; it
is impossible to draw the line without reference to a specific time.
You know where it was yesterday but only litigation can deter-
mine where it will be tomorrow," B. W. Levit, "Federalism, Cen-
tralization and the States," (1944) 19 Calif. S.B.A.J. 73, 85.
29. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941).
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tion upon the construction of the National Labor Relations
Act.
Notwithstanding the National Labor Relations Act, it
has been judicially determined that some state action is per-
mitted.30 The state may regulate employee and union prac-
tices and behavior in prohibiting violence and regulating strike
conduct.31 Further, "a state statute will be condemned as
in conflict with national legislation only if the conflict is
clearly shown. ' 32 It could be further argued that the policy
of the Indiana Act is parallel to that of the Taft-Hartley
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act in regulating
strikes affecting the public interest.
2. Federal Constitutionality.
The Act does not purport to restrict the right to picket,
therefore, no problem is raised concerning restraint of free-
dom of speech.33 The Act specifically preserves the individual's
right to cease employment. 4 No problem of conflict with
the 13th Amendment is presented since, as individuals, one
or many may leave work.35 The criminal penalty attaches
only when one induces or agrees with others to cease employ-
ment in concert.
The remaining federal constitutional issue presented is
the possible contention that the Act restricts the individual's
freedom of contract and right to strike.38 In a 1925 case in-
30. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Int. Alliance v. Wise. Employ.
Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942); United Elec., Radio and M.W. v
Westinghouse, 65 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
31. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Int. Alliance v. Wise. Employ.
Rel. Bd., n. 30, supra; Allen-Bradley Local U.E.R.M.W. v. Wise.,
Employ. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942); cf Fashioncraft v. Hal-
pern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E. (2d) 1 (1943).
32. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,
467 (1945).
33. Cf. Thornhill v. Ala., 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
34. Section 15 provides, "Nothing in this act shall be construed to
require an individual employee to render labor or service without
his consent, or make illegal the quitting of his labor or service or
the withdrawal from his place of employment in concert or by
agreement with others . . . "
35. People, by Keyes, Att'y. Gen. v. United Mine Workers, 70 Colo.
269, 201 Pac. 54 (1921).
36. The Supreme Court in 1923-25 declared unconstitutional, in its
application to the meat packing industry, a Kansas act similar
to the Indiana Act. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); 267 U.S. 552 (1925). The
case is of doubtful value today in view of the fact that it was de-
cided in the hey-day of substantive due process which has since
been severely limited by the Supreme Court. Also decided under
317.19471
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volving a Kansas statute similar to the Indiana Act, the Su-
preme Court upheld a conviction for violation of the act in
inducing a strike which was illegal under both that act and
the common law.37  The Court went on to say that "Neither
the common law, nor the 14th amendment confers the absolute
right to strike."38 While the right to strike is recognized
as a privilege and has been removed from the common law
crime of conspiracy, it has not yet been given the status of
a constitutional guarantee.39
I In view of the tendency of the Supreme Court to uphold
state exercise of police power 0 when not in conflict with
federal legislation or federally reserved constitutional prerog-
atives, coupled with the dormancy of substantive due process4'
and the impotency of the contract clause,4 2 it is believed that
the Act would not be held unconstitutional upon federal
grounds.
3. State Constitutionality.
Only two principle issues of state constitutionality are
raised by the Act. The delegation of functions of a ju-
dicial nature to an administrative body presents what is
by now an academic question. The establishment of admin-
istrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions has long been
upheld in Indiana.43
Section 12 of the Act, however, purports to make the
decision of the Circuit Court, on review, final. In view of
the Kan. Act were: Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Dor-
chy v. Kansas, n. 37, infra.
37. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
38. Id at 311; See also Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 353 (1917).
39. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
40. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. N.Y.,
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); So.
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
41. See, C. P. Curtis Jr., "Due, and Democratic Process of Law,"(1944) 44 Wisc. L. Rev. 39.
42. Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934);
Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U.S. 32 (1940);
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
43. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900) [Public Health];
Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E. (2d) 472
(1939) [Banking]; 'cf. Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E.
438 (1934) [Dept. of Conservation] Dunn, Auditor, v. City of In-
dianapolis, 208 Ind. 630, 196 N.E. 528 (1935) [State Bd. of Tax
Comm.]; In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667,
171 N.E. 65 (1930) [Public Service Comm.]; cf. Mo. ex rel.
Haughey v. Ryan, 182 Mo. 349, 81 S.W. 435 (1904).
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the prior decisions, it is clear that the legislature cannot so
limit the right of judicial review.4'
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Introduction. Chapter 365 regulates administrative ad-
judication and judicial review thereof. This act completes
the establishment of uniform methods for administrative ac-
tion.' The acts of 1945 and 1947 are the state counterpart of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act ;2 however, the pro-
cedure prescribed is considerably different. Chapter 365 is
confined to "administrative adjudication"' which is defined
as the determination by an agency of issues applicable to par-
ticular persons.4
The act applies to "all agencies of the state of Indiana,"'
except those specifically exempted. By one interpretation this
would mean only those agencies whose jurisdiction is co-ex-
tensive with the state.6 By a more enlarged interpretation
it could mean those agencies that receive their authority
under the laws of the state and perform some of the govern-
mental functions of the state.7 The latter interpretation has
been applied in cases deciding whether a person is holding
more than one lucrative office at the same time.8 But if
that interpretation is used, the act would drastically change
the administration of county and other local government. It
44. Curless v. Wilson, 180 Ind. 86, 102 N.E. 497 (1913); War~ren
v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E. (2d) 399 (1940);
Square D Co. v. O'Neal, 72 N.E. (2d) 654 (Ind. 1947).
1. An act of 1945, governs administrative "rule making." Ind. Acts
1945, c. 120, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §§60-1501 to
60-1511.
2. 46 Stat. 324, 951 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. §§001 to 1011 (Supp. 1946).
For model state act see, (1944) Handbook, Nat'l Conf. Conm'r
Uniform State Laws, p. 329.
3. See, Fuchs, "Procedure in Administrative Rule Making" (1938)
52 Harv. L. Rev. 259.
4. Jnd. Acts 1947, c. 365, §2. Compare with the more limited defini-
tion in the Federal act. Because of this difference in definition,
the Indiana act will have a much wider application than the
provisions of the Federal act dealing with "administrative adjudica-
tion."
5. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 365, §1.
6. See Ramsay v. Van Meter, 300 Ill. 193, 200, 133 N.E. 193, 195
(1921); People v. Evans, 247 Ill. 47, 555, 93 N.E. 388, 391 (1910).
7. See Ex parte Preston, 72 Tex. Cr. 77, 161 S.W. 115, (1913).
8. Chambers v. State, 127 Ind. 365, 26 N.E. 893 (1891); Foltz v.
Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221, 4 N.E. 439 (1886) " see Ops. Att'y. Gen., Ind.
(1943) p. 693.
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